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> Recent Incidents & PIAs, p. 2
POST
INCIDENT ANALYSIS
Glendale Metrolink Rail Disaster
Page 2
- MAC
eventually gave LFD hospital availability but they made errors
there. They sent out a computer message asking for bed availability
via REDINET but if the hospital did not respond they did not landline
them to get the status thereby leaving out several nearby hospitals.
They also sent the hospitals out in geographical order but it
was wrong. Dr. Eckstein (LFD MD) felt that all the trauma centers
should have been called because the critical patients could have
been flown out. There were less than 10 critical patients; one
died in triage yet none of the patients who were transported died
in the hospitals.
- They
used 15 hospitals in total but the 2 closest got about 30 patients
each.
- LFD
is working on a new form for patient transportation tracking that
has a map of their battalions with the hospitals location on it
(so they can see if all hospitals have been contacted and their
relative locations to the incident).
- There
was a backup with getting patients who had been triaged off the
train. Both agencies used police officers to start moving the
patients. They also both agreed there should be a litter bearer
unit leader position (they also said that they had every patient
except one off the trains by 0628-hrs which is pretty impressive).
- There
was a 2000’ crime scene perimeter and PD had a difficult
time maintaining control of it. Units had to contend with media,
convergent volunteers, and eventually, family members coming into
their treatment areas.
Glendale
fire dept dedicated one of their units to a community support
function and they dealt with the family members—who were
eventually sent to Glendale police dept where they had an information
center, Red Cross counselors, etc.
- LFD
had 300 personnel on scene and Glendale fire dept had 75 people.
- Personnel
had a problem with rotor noise from all the news copters but never
called for flight restrictions, (they had 2 LFD copters on scene
and their pilots could have easily done that for them).
- Both
agencies tried to get the names of people that they transported
but many victims did not have ID on them. This became a problem
when certain agencies and politicians (FBI, LAPD, city council
aides) had people they knew were on the trains and wanted their
status.
LFD
dedicated an EMS Captain to liaison with those groups and then
go to the treatment areas and try to find them. The agencies
tried to landline the hospitals where they had sent patients
to get names but many hospitals would not cooperate.
MAC
eventually got the names from the hospital and faxed them to
a nearby TOGO sandwich shop as NONE of the many command vehicles
on scene had a working fax machine. They were able to get the
information within about 3 hours of the event.
- Glendale
fire dept had trouble with their EMS forms because of the rain.
Many of the triage tags had the strings tied in a knot and were
not usable (they now carry zip ties to use if it happens again).
Also
ballpoint pens would not write well on the triage tags but Sharpies
worked great.
- Dr.
Eckstein pointed out that the triage tags do not address trauma
center criteria (especially diffuse abdominal tenderness) so people
should be more completely evaluated once they are initially sorted
when there is time.
- On
both sides of the tracks the immediate, delayed and minor tarps
were set up in close proximity to each other and there was a problem
with the minor patients going over to see their friends in immediate
or delayed. Both agencies ended up moving minor patients quite
a distance away.
- People
who said they were not injured were sent to an area where PD was
for interviews.
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