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POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS
Glendale Metrolink Rail Disaster

Crown Fire - Lessons Learned

Activities > Recent Incidents & PIAs

POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS
Glendale Metrolink Rail Disaster

By Debbie Lawrence, Battalion Chief
Battalion 20-B

(At the direction of Executive Staff members and motivated by interest, BC Debbie Lawrence attended the Post Incident Analysis (PIA) conducted by responding emergency response agencies to the January 26, 2005 Glendale Metro-link Rail Disaster. The following are notes of the PIA as reflected by BC Lawrence)

  • The first 911 call came in at 0602-hrs. LFD TF 50 dispatched at 0603-hrs and arrived at 0608-hrs. They were sent to the Costco address and saw a light smoke column. The initial thought was they had a vehicle fire. It had been raining with heavy ground mist and was quite dark.

    Units got to the back of Costco and saw the overturned locomotive with fire impinging on the 5000 gal diesel tanks and could see people moving inside the first Metro-Link car which was now perpendicular to the tracks. The fire was a threat to that car. E50 took a hydrant and began fire suppression. The tillerman started cutting the chain link fence. The AO did a lap for size-up and the TFC started ordering resources. E50 personnel started triage.

    The initial resource order bump was for 3TF, and 5RAs. LFD BN2 arrived on scene at Costco, did a lap, and took command ordering 10 TFs, 10RAs, USAR, copters and 4 BCs.

  • E50 personnel found a victim who was agonal and had to ignore him which was very difficult for them (they made the comment its not the same as condemning a cone at a MCI drill).
  • Glendale Fire Department got dispatched to San Fernando and Chevy Chase (their training center is near that location). Glendale Info 2 was going to the TC to exercise and was first to arrive on scene and was accosted by walking wounded coming from about a ¼ mile away.

    He gave a size-up and corrected the location. He sent the walking wounded to a nearby public works yard. The first arriving engine was given patient care at the yard, the BC sent the second engine further down to scout it out and they found Magnolia St to have the best access. He made that engine Magnolia division and Glendale fire dept ran their operations from there.

  • Glendale fire dept BCs monitor their PD channel. Hearing them talk about victims at Costco, THE Glendale BC went to investigate and that’s how he hooked up with the LFD BC.

    They backed their command vehicles up to each other and ran a modified unified command. They agreed it was Glendale’s incident. They did not have the capability to talk to each other on the radios (LFD eventually had 16 radio channels in use) LFD’s comm. unit was on scene by 0650 and brought 25 spare radios and many extra batteries.

  • The initial BCs decided to run separate Medical Groups because of geographical limitations. Concerns were voiced about having separate MED COMs and transportation areas. In retrospect the agencies felt that they were more efficient running 2 transportation areas as they could get patients loaded faster.
  • LFD radio traffic was jammed with incoming resources requesting assignments (a suggestion is to either establish staging on a separate channel or have them do a face to face for assignments).
  • Both agencies agreed that they should have placed numbers on each rail car much earlier in the incident to avoid duplicate searches. They did get spray paint from USAR units and used the “X” system to indicate the search company, number of victims, etc. They did eventually number the cars 1-6.
  • The Sheriff who died was found immediately and Glendale Police dept posted an officer with the body.
  • An LFD EMS captain used his PA to send walking wounded to the front of Costco.
  • Glendale fire dept ended up sending 4 patients per ambulance. Critical patients went to USC by themselves.
  • Both agencies have RAs that transport patients. They responded several AMR ambulances to keep their PM’s on-scene. LFD transport officer used FFs to drive some of the RA’s.
  • Fire agencies agree that many difficulties were encountered with MAC. Glendale fire dept RA 25 contacted MAC to tell them they had an MCI and MAC said they would not help them because they were running an incident with LFD. LFD called MAC and they were told that they would not talk to them because RA 25 had already called. Glendale fire dept RA 25 radioman called every nearby hospital on his cell phone to get their bed status.

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